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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERLIN DANSIE, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
- vs 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant, 
Case No,. 14592 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action initiated by ffferlin Dansie for 
an order restraining Murray City from enforcing its build-
ing height restriction ordinances as concerning a storage 
shed Plaintiff was constructing on his 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the CourtI Plaintiff's -
Respondent's petition of an extraordinary writ was granted, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
residential property. 
Defendant - Appellant seeks a reversal of Honorable 
Marcelus K. Snow's Order granting Respondent's petition for 
a restraining order. 
~ 1 -
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Merlin Dansie, resides at 5864 South 
157 West, Murray, Utah. He is in the contracting business 
and operates an office in his home at such address under 
a "home occupation11 status. On January 21, 1976, Plaintiff 
applied to the Murray City Engineering Department for a build-
ing permit to construct a "storage sheci", and "accessory 
building" under the ordinances, in the rear yard area of his 
property. Plaintiff submitted a sketch showing horizontal 
dimensions only. Said dimensions showed that the proposed 
building would be 14f x 19?4". Dansie paid his fee and 
received a building permit for such accessory building. At 
that time, Plaintiff asked an employee of the Engineering 
Department, Mr. Lorin Simper, what the I building height re-
quirements were for the residential zotie in which Plaintiff's 
property was located. Simper indicated that he believed that 
the ordinances would allow a building lfieight of thirty-five 
(35) feet, 
Dansie commenced construction ot the storage shed to 
an unfinished height of approximately 18 feet, which was then 
approximately three feet higher than the main building, the 
house. It was then brought to the attention of the City official? 
that the building was unusually high. Upon investigation 
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it was discovered that the building was in fact, higher than 
the main building, contrary to City Ordinance No. 4004-15 
which states: 
No building which is accessory to a one-family, 
two-family, three-family or four-family dwell-
ing shall be erected to a height greater than 
one (1) story or twenty feet, except in no case 
shall the height exceed the height of the main 
building. Eaves of such accessory building 
shall not be higher than the eaye line of the 
main building nor shall the pit^h exceed the 
pitch of the roof of the main building. 
The City, on March 16, 1976, notified Dansie of the 
violation and instructed him to cease construction and to 
bring the building into compliance. Dansie then petitioned the 
District Court for a restraining order against the City. The 
City presented an Affidavit from Mr. Simper explaining his 
limitations of authority regarding zoning matters, his unax^ are-
ness of Ordinance No. 4004-15 at the time he talked to Dansie, 
and the circumstances surrounding said conversation. City 
Engineer, Charles Clay, also submitted his Affidavit stating 
Mr. Simper's limited authority with respect to the enter-
pretation of Zoning Ordinances and stated that Simper had, 
in fact, exceeded his authority. 
The Honorable Marcelus K, Snow, District Judge, granted 
Plaintiff's petition restraining Defendant from enforcing 
its zoning laws as to this incident. [The City herewith Appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CITY IS NOT BOUND BY REPRESENTATIONS OF ITS EMPLOYEES 
OR AGENTS TO THIRD PERSONS WERE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE CONTRARY 
TO CITY ORDINANCE AND WHICH ARE MADE 1^ EXCESS OF SAID 
EMPLOYEES AUTHORITY. 
The great weight of authority holds that a municipal 
corporation is not bound by acts or statements of its officers 
or agents, made in excess of their authority, even where a 
third party has relied thereon to his cfetriment. 
The general rule, followed in all but a handful of 
exceptional cases, is that a municipal body is not estopped 
or bound by unauthorized acts or statements of its officers 
1 2 
or employees, Utah followed this position in a 1944 case 
which does not appear to have been overturned or modified. 
Even in cases where the City official may have committed 
substantial error causing extensive damage to the person 
attempting to invoke it, the Courts have been constrained 
to apply the doctrine of estoppel. Th^ case of 154 East 
Park Avenue Corporation vs. City of Long Beach, 350 NYS 2d 
974 (1973) was such a case and the Court there stated that 
"where a municipal worker improperly applies a city law, and 
1, 3 McQuillan Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., §12.126a 
Also see 6 A,L,R. 2nd 960. 
2. Petty et al, vs. Borg, 106 U524, 150 P2nd 776 (1944) 
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someone relies upon that application, the law does not 
become a nullity; the employee action does.11 In another 
case the Court held that ". . . conduct . . . as individuals, 
however harsh and unjust its affect . . . cannot be used to 
prejudice or destroy the rights of the public to require 
enforcement of valid laws and ordinances as written.11 
The recognized exception to the general rule is 
commonly referred to as the "Illinois Rule.11 This exception 
was the result of a case decided by the Illinois Court. 
There, the Plaintiff had installed gas storage tanks and 
pumps in reliance upon a permit issued by the City. The City 
waited over seven months before notifying Plaintiff that 
there was an ordinance violation and tfye permit should not 
have been issued in the first instance^ 
In our case the permit was properly issued and as soon 
as it was evident that Dansie was constructing his storage 
shed too high he was notified. At that point, the evidence 
pointed out, all Dansie needed to do to comply with the law 
was to remove approximately three courses of block, as the 
roof had not been installed. 
Courts have recognized the so-called "Illinois Rule" 
but refused to apply it because circumstances were not severe 
3- City of San Antonio v. Humble Oil & Refining Co 
~™T7~~SW 2d" 868 (T930) ' " 
4. Cities Service Oil Co. vs. City of DesPlaines, 
nnrn~HT57, rrnr.E. 2d 605, ew. 
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enough to warrant a deviation from the long established general 
rule.5 
The Court in State ex rel Barker v. Town of Stevens-
ville, 523 P2d 1388, analyzed the two positions and compared 
the requirements for the application of each before holding that 
estoppel did not apply. The Courts musj t be extremely cautious 
in applying estoppel against a governmental entity, especially 
where it is ftmctioning in its governmental, rather than 
proprietary capacity. It is true that Courts have granted 
exceptions to the general rule, but only in cases where it 
7 
was necessary to prevent "manifest injustice.11 No such 
circumstances are present in the case ^t hand. Also, in our 
case, to grant estoppel would interfere with governmental 
function, of the orderly and consistent application of zoning 
o 
regulations, which is one of the criteria to be considered. 
Even in Illinois, the home of the rule of exception, 
the Court has considered the so-called "Illinois Rule" applicable 
only under extraordinary cases aijd has refused to grant 
9 
estoppel. 
5- City of Huchins vs. Prasifka, 450 SW 2d 835 (Texas 197C 
State ex rel Natrl Bank of Tacoma v. City of Tacoma, 
166 P. 66 
State v. Northwest Magnesit$ Co., 182 P2d 643. 
6. Metropolitan Park District o:T~Tacoma v. State Departmer 
of Natural Resources, STTfash. 2d 821, 539 P. 2d 854 
7. 28 Am JurTdT Estoppel and Waiver §128, 129. 
8. Supra. i 
9. PeopTTe ex rel American National Bank & Trust Co. of 
Chicago vs. SmTthTTlO 111. App. 2d 354, 24~9 N.E. 2d 
Ganley v. City oF~Chicago, 18 111 App 3d 248, 309 N.E. 
City of Chicago vs. Exchange National Bank, 273 N.E. 2c 
484 (1971) 
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It is clear that the City employee who gave respondent 
the misinformation concerning building height requirements 
was acting beyond his authority. It ig generally held that 
11
. . . estoppel will not be applied wh^re the officials 
on whose conduct or acts it is sought to be predicated, 
acted wholly beyond their power and authority.!T It is 
further stated that f,no estoppel can grow out of dealings with 
municipal officers of limited authority in respect of matters 
11 
as to which such authority has been exceeded." 
10, 28 Am. Jur, 2d Estoppel anc^  Waiver §122. 
11, Supra § 130 Cities Service Oil Co. vs. City of 
Des Plaines,""2rTTT7^cTl57, 171 N.E. 2d 605, 608 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
A PERSON DEALING WITH A CITY HAS A DUTY TO INQUIRE AS TO 
THE EXTENT OF-THE AUTHORITY OF THE CITY AGENT OR EMPLOYEE WITH 
WHOM SUCH PERSON IS DEALING. 
It is generally conceded that ". . . all who contract 
with a municipal corporation are charged with notice of the 
extent of its powers and of the powers of the municipal 
12 
officers and agents with whom they contract . . .fl 
13 
In the Ganley case the Court ruled that "anyone dealing 
with a governmental body takes the risk of having accurately 
ascertained that he who purports to act for it stays within 
i / 
the bounds of his authority." There was absolutely no 
evidence that respondent inquired of Simper as to his duties 
or authority. 
12. 10 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, §29.02 
See also §37.103. 
13. Ganley vs. City of Chicago, Supra. 
1 4
 > Chicago vs. S^itKTTTO I EL App. 2d 354, 249 N.E. 2d 2 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted tha[t estoppel was 
improperly invoked under the facts and circumstances of 
this case. The order of the District Qourt should be re-
versed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERRILL G. HANSEN 
Murray City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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